We analyze a two-sided search model in which we assume utility is not perfectly transferable. Except for this assumption the model is standard, yet it generates results that are quite different from those obtained in models with transferable utility. In particular, the model has multiple...

We extend simple search-theoretic models of crime, unemployment and inequality to incorporate on-the-job search. This is valuable because, although the simple models can be used to illustrate some important points concerning the economics of crime, on-the-job search models are more relevant...

There is much discussion of the relationships between crime, inequality, and unemployment. We construct a model where all three are endogenous. We find that introducing crime into otherwise standard models of labor markets has several interesting implications. For example, it can lead to wage...

We extend simple search models of crime, unemployment, and inequality to incorporate on-the-job search. This is valuable because, although simple models are useful, on-the-job search models are more interesting theoretically and more relevant empirically. We characterize the wage distribution,...

There has been much discussion of the relationships between crime, inequality and unemployment. We construct a model where all three are endogenous. Introducing crime into otherwise standard models affects the labor market in several interesting ways. For example, we show how the crime rate...

We analyze models where agents search for partners to form relationships (employment, marriage, etc.), and may continue searching for different partners while matched. Matched agents are less inclined to search if their match yields more utility and if it is more stable. If one partner searches...

Suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good. Sellers post prices, and then buyers choose sellers. In symmetric equilibrium, similar sellers all post one price, and buyers randomize. Hence, more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can...