A dynamic model of managerial entrenchment and the positive incentives it creates
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Guthrie, Graeme A. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic dynamics & control. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889, ZDB-ID 717409-3. - Vol. 123.2021, p. 1-28
|
Subject: | Corporate governance | Entrenchment | Executive compensation | Nash bargaining solution | Ownership-based incentives | Corporate Governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory |
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