An analytically solvable principal-agent model
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mattsson, Lars-Göran ; Weibull, Jörgen W. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 140.2023, p. 33-49
|
Subject: | Principal-agent | Moral hazard | Hidden action | Optimal contract | Debt contract | Legendre | f-divergence | Kullback-Leibler | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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