Balancing the power to appoint officers
Year of publication: |
January 2017
|
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Authors: | Barberà, Salvador ; Coelho, Danilo |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 101.2017, p. 189-203
|
Subject: | Voting rules | Constitutional design | Strong Nash equilibrium | Rule of k names | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verfassungsökonomik | Constitutional economics |
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