Committing to Incentives: Should the Decision to Sanctionbe Revealed or Hidden?
Year of publication: |
2010-03-02
|
---|---|
Authors: | Klempt, Charlotte ; Pull, Kerstin |
Institutions: | Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion |
Subject: | Agency-Theorie | Anreiz | Intrinsische Motivation | Arbeitsleistung | Performance | Sanktion | sanctions |
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related research
- 3 Experiment design, procedures and theoretical predictions
- 3.1 Experimental design
- 3.2 Experimental procedures
- 3.3 Theoretical predictions
- 4 Results
- 4.1 Agents’ behavior
- 4.2 Principals’ behavior
- 4.3 Conclusion
- A Appendix: Instructions
- References
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Punishment fosters efficiency in the minimum effort coordination game
Le Lec, Fabrice, (2012)
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Punishment fosters efficiency in the minimum effort coordination game
Le Lec, Fabrice, (2012)
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