Conflict, evolution, hegemony, and the power of the state
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Levine, David K. ; Modica, Salvatore |
Institutions: | Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis |
Subject: | Game theory |
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