Fiscal rules, bailouts, and reputation in federal governments
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dovis, Alessandro ; Kirpalani, Rishabh |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 110.2020, 3, p. 860-888
|
Subject: | Finanzpolitik | Fiscal policy | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Reputation | Öffentliche Schulden | Public debt | Finanzausgleich | Intergovernmental transfers | Regierung | Government | Schuldenübernahme | Bailout | Föderalismus | Federalism | Haushaltskonsolidierung | Fiscal consolidation |
-
Fiscal Rules, Bailouts, and Reputation in Federal Governments
Dovis, Alessandro, (2017)
-
Fiscal Rules, Bailouts, and Reputation in Federal Governments
Dovis, Alessandro, (2017)
-
Sovereign bail-outs and fiscal rules in a banking union
Marattin, Luigi, (2022)
- More ...
-
Fiscal rules, bailouts, and reputation in federal governments
Dovis, Alessandro, (2017)
-
Rules without Commitment : Reputation and Incentives
Dovis, Alessandro, (2019)
-
Fiscal Rules, Bailouts, and Reputation in Federal Governments
Dovis, Alessandro, (2017)
- More ...