How long-term contracts can mitigate inefficient renegotiation arising due to loss aversion
Year of publication: |
June 14, 2021 ; [Revidierte Fassung]
|
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Authors: | Göller, Daniel |
Published in: |
Jahrestagung 2020 ; 95
|
Publisher: |
[Köln] : Verein für Socialpolitik |
Subject: | Incomplete Contracts | Behavioral Contract Theory | Reference points | Holdup | Renegotiation | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Vertrag | Contract |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Konferenzbeitrag ; Conference paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/234733 [Handle] |
Classification: | D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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