Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties : punishment or rent extraction?
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 224.2023, p. 1-4
|
Subject: | Moral hazard | Limited liability | Hidden action | Incentive contracts | Job design | Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung | Public pension system | Moral Hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Beschränkte Haftung | Theorie | Theory |
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Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties : punishment or rent extraction?
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