International environmental agreements with the formation of multiple coalitions
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Takashima, Nobuyuki |
Published in: |
Applied economics letters. - New York, NY : Routledge, ISSN 1466-4291, ZDB-ID 1484783-8. - Vol. 30.2023, 4, p. 524-530
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Subject: | heterogeneous countries | International environmental agreements | multiple coalitions | repeated game | weakly renegotiation-proof | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Koalition | Coalition | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Klimaschutz | Climate protection | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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