Moral hazard problem and collaborative coordination in supply chain with capacity reservation contract
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Takemoto, Yasuhiko ; Arizono, Ikuo |
Published in: |
International journal of production research. - London [u.a.] : Taylor & Francis, ISSN 1366-588X, ZDB-ID 1485085-0. - Vol. 58.2020, 8, p. 2510-2526
|
Subject: | forced and voluntary compliance regimes | incentive compatible condition | moral hazard problem | Nash bargaining approach | penalty strategy | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Lieferkette | Supply chain | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
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