Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Auster, Sarah ; Pavoni, Nicola |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 19.2024, 1, p. 245-284
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Subject: | optimal delegation | renegotiation | Unawareness | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Signalling |
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