Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Candogan, Ozan ; Strack, Philipp |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 18.2023, 3, p. 1225-1269
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Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | information design | partitional signals | private information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Signalling | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationswert | Information value | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference |
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