Outside versus inside bonds: A ModiglianiâMiller type result for liquidity constrained economies
When agents are liquidity constrained, two options exist â sell assets or borrow. We compare the allocations arising in two economies: in one, agents can sell government (outside) bonds and in the other they can borrow by issuing (inside) bonds. All transactions are voluntary, implying no taxation or forced redemption of private debt. We show that any allocation in the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with outside bonds but that the converse is not true. However, the optimal policy in each economy makes the allocations equivalent.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Berentsen, Aleksander ; Waller, Christopher |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 146.2011, 5, p. 1852-1887
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Liquidity Financial markets Monetary policy Search |
Saved in:
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