Pareto optimal anonymous mechanisms
Year of publication: |
February 2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mukherjee, Conan |
Publisher: |
Calcutta : Indian Institute of Management Calcutta |
Subject: | indivisible object allocation | mechanism design | strategyproofness | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Allokation | Allocation | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Unteilbare Güter | Indivisible goods | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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