Renegotiation, discrimination and favoritism in symmetric procurement auctions
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Arozamena, Leandro ; Ganuza, Juan José ; Weinschelbaum, Federico |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 159.2023, p. 1-12
|
Subject: | Auctions | Favoritism | Auction design | Renegotiation | Corruption | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Korruption | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Auktion | Auction | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Patronage | Clientelism |
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