Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
Year of publication: |
March 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Carroll, Gabriel |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 85.2017, 2, p. 453-488
|
Subject: | Bundling | generalized virtual value | mechanism design | multidimensional screening | robustness | separation | Signalling | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics | Leistungsbündel | Bundling strategy | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Multivariate Analyse | Multivariate analysis |
-
A very robust auction mechanism
MacLean, Richard P., (2018)
-
"Payoff implications of incentive contracting"
Garrett, Daniel F., (2020)
-
Payoff implications of incentive contracting
Garrett, Daniel F., (2021)
- More ...
-
Robustness and Linear Contracts
Carroll, Gabriel, (2015)
-
An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences
Carroll, Gabriel, (2010)
-
A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
Carroll, Gabriel, (2014)
- More ...