Subcontracting and rework cost sharing in engineering-procurement-construction projects
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chen, Zhenzhen ; Zhu, Wanshan ; Crama, Pascale |
Published in: |
International journal of production economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0925-5273, ZDB-ID 1092526-0. - Vol. 262.2023, p. 1-13
|
Subject: | Incentive contract | Moral hazard | Project management | Rework | Subcontracting | Projektmanagement | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Moral Hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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