Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Watson, Joel |
Institutions: | University of California, San Diego / Department of Economics (issuing body) |
Publisher: |
San Diego : Department of Economics, UC San Diego |
Subject: | relational contracts | enforcement | game theory | negotiation | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Vertrag | Contract |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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