When the principal knows better than the agent : Subjective evaluations as an optimal disclosure mechanism
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zhang, Mengxi |
Published in: |
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. - Wiley, ISSN 1530-9134, ZDB-ID 1481233-2. - Vol. 28.2019, 4, p. 631-655
|
Publisher: |
Wiley |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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