Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms
Year of publication: |
June 2021
|
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Authors: | Attar, Andrea ; Campioni, Eloisa ; Mariotti, Thomas ; Pavan, Alessandro |
Publisher: |
[Toulouse] : Toulouse School of Economics |
Subject: | Incomplete Information | Competing Mechanisms | Private Disclosures | Signals | Universal Mechanisms | Folk Theorems | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Signalling | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Privatisierung | Privatization |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten) |
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Series: | Working papers / TSE : WP. - Toulouse, ZDB-ID 2816658-9. - Vol. no 1227 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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