Keeping the agents in the dark : private disclosures in competing mechanisms
Year of publication: |
12 December 2021
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Authors: | Attar, Andrea ; Campioni, Eloisa ; Mariotti, Thomas ; Pavan, Alessandro |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | incomplete information | competing mechanisms | Private Disclosures | Folk Theorems | Universal Mechanisms | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Privatisierung | Privatization |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten) |
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Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP16807 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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