Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 183995-0. - Vol. 198.2021, p. 1-6
|
Subject: | Public goods | Control rights | Incomplete contracts | Investment incentives | Private information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Öffentliche Güter | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
-
The proper scope of government reconsidered : asymmetric information and incentive contracts
Schmitz, Patrick W., (2023)
-
Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
Auster, Sarah, (2013)
-
Interpreting contracts : the purposive approach and non-comprehensive incentive contracts
Bental, Benjamin, (2020)
- More ...
-
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge
Ewerhart, Christian, (1996)
-
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem
Schmitz, Patrick W., (2002)
-
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998)
Schmitz, Patrick W., (2000)
- More ...