The proper scope of government reconsidered : asymmetric information and incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 157.2023, p. 1-13
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Subject: | Incomplete contracts | Privatization | Control rights | Asymmetric information | Investment incentives | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Privatisierung | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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