Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kambhampati, Ashwin |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 207.2023, p. 1-14
|
Subject: | Randomization | Robustness | Principal-agent models | Zero-sum games | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics |
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