Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zhang, Mengxi |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 19.2024, 1, p. 95-129
|
Subject: | incomplete information | mechanism design | Optimal contest | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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